



‘The Irish Reform Act of 1868’ 
Colin Barr 
From the Act of Union until 18845, the Irish electoral franchise was different to that in England 
or Scotland. The history of its reform also followed a different calendar: 1829, 1832, 1850, and 
1868 were the waypoints on the path to homogenization with the rest of the United Kingdom. 
But the Irish Reform Act of 1868 has received little attention, and is usually dismissed as a minor 
technical alteration of minimal political or social importance. When set against the changes in 
England the year before, this is true. But it is worthy of study, and this article is the first to 
examine the 1860s campaign for Irish reform, its relationship to events in Britain, the 
expectations for the Act, its various drafts and its political consequences. It traces the short-lived 
alliance between the catholic church, the Irish Liberal party and often secular working class 
radicals – often secular – in both Ireland and England, as well as the parallel but quite distinct 
campaign for reform on the part of working -class northern protestants, many associated with the 
Orange Order. Although political circumstance resulted in the abandonment of most of the 
projected reforms, the drafting process and accompanying debates reveal important aspects of 
Irish political realities and expectations, as well as the limits of parliamentary interest in Ireland. 
Even in its abbreviated form, the Act had a significant impact on Irish politics, substantially 
increasing the borough electorate across the island and dramatically so in Ulster.  
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When Anthony Trollope wrote Phineas Finn, The Irish Member between May 1866 and June 
1867, it was natural that he should assign his hero a small Irish borough.  His fictional 
Loughshane in County Galway had a mere 307 electors.   They were, the young Phineas was 
assured by the worldly Liberal fixer Barrington Earle, ‘so far removed from the world, and were 
so ignorant of the world’s good things, that they knew nothing about bribery.’ They required of 
their prospective member only that he be an Irishman and a catholic.  Even the local tory 
landlord – a friend of Finn’s father – was prepared to see a catholic Liberal elected as a way of 
spiting his brother, the sitting MP.  What expenses there were would be ‘defrayed out of a certain 
fund collected for such purposes.’1 It was all easily settled and Finn was duly elected.   
 
Trollope’s fiction was perfectly plausible.  To take only one example, the English catholic 
aristocrat Sir John Acton, the future Lord Acton, was returned for Carlow borough in 1859 on a 
poll of 117 against the Conservative incumbent’s 103.  The seat had been found for him by party 
fixers at the behest of his politically prominent step-father, and his expenses (around £4 per vote) 
seem to have been paid largely from central funds.  Carlow’s electors were at least more open-
minded than those of Loughshane, and did not insist that their candidate be Irish, but merely a 
catholic.  Nor did they mind that Acton (like Phineas) did not visit his constituency until after his 
election.2 In both fiction and reality, Irish electoral politics in the 1860s remained a world of 
small boroughs, biddable voters, local power (clerical and landed), confessional identity, 
absentee candidates, party money, and distant fixers, and itsThe Irish franchise was distinct from 
that in Britain and would remained distinct from that in Britain until remain so until 18845, when 





In the wake of the Union of 1801, the Irish county franchise was fixed at 40 shillings freehold 
while the boroughs employed a bewildering variety of criteria. Some of these were generous and 
included 40 shilling freeholders, others were not and granted the franchise only to certain 
members of the corporation. Most fell somewhere in between.  
The first substantive change came with the Irish Parliamentary Act (1829), which was designed 
to limit catholic political power by eliminating the 40 shilling franchise in the counties and 
replacing it with a £10 freehold. This reduced the county electorate from some 216,000 to 
perhaps 37,000, but did nothing to alter the idiosyncratic and variable borough franchises. In 
1832, the Representation of the People (Ireland) Act and the Parliamentary Boundaries (Ireland) 
Act half-heartedly attempted to address this, adding a second seat to four boroughs and to Dublin 
University (giving Ireland a total of 105), changing some boundaries, and prescribing a uniform 
franchise across the boroughs. It had a limited impact in the counties beyond enfranchising some 
categories of leaseholders, although this did see the country electorate grow to some 60,000. In 
the boroughs, it created a householder franchise set at £10 annual value and abolished the 40 
shilling freehold, exempting those who had already qualified on that basis. It also left the 
‘freeman’ vote intact, which was largely poor, biddable and (outside Galway) protestant. The 
resulting borough electorate was nearly 30,000. With the exception of the Scottish borough 
franchise, this was narrower than elsewhere in the United Kingdom: K. T. Hoppen calculated 
that in the Irish counties there was 1 voter per 116 inhabitants, and in the boroughs 1 in every 26. 
The numbers in England and Wales were 1: 24 and 1: 17, and in Scotland 1: 45 and 1: 27.4 
 
The practical problems were legion: rapacious freeman; erratic, arbitrary, and partisan 
registration procedures; plural, fraudulent, and informally heritable voting; judicial 
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disagreements about how to assess value, usually resolved on partisan lines and without 
consistency; and a steady decline in the granting of leases, partly for economic and partly for 
political reasons, with the effect of reducing the county electorate. Hoppen estimated that the 
electorate actually decreased between 1832 and 1850, despite the population growing over most 
of the period.5 This was widely known or at least suspected, and no fewer than 14 bills were 
printed between 1835 and 1850 in an attempt to address the problem.6 But most were absurdly 
complicated and few were pursued with any great conviction.  
The Famine accelerated the previously slow-motion collapse of the electorate, and by 1850 
change was unavoidable. In introducing his solution, Lord John Russell drew the attention of the 
House of Commons to the ‘paucity of electors’, and gave the example of a recent election in 
County Meath in which only 250 people had voted. John Bright put it more robustly: Ireland’s 
electorate had been ‘virtually extinguished’.7 Russell’s plan was comparatively generous: in the 
counties, the £10 qualification of a freehold or lengthy leasehold was replaced by an occupier 
franchise for properties with a rateable value of at least £12; in the boroughs, the standard was £8 
of rateable value. In both cases, this eliminated the need to value property specifically for 
electoral purposes, a subjective process that was prone to capricious, partisan and not 
infrequently perverse outcomes. Using rateable value made the process more predictable, 
although it did not eliminate all distortions or opportunities for chicanery. Most but not all of 
those were addressed in 1852 with the creation of a new national system of valuations, although 
that took several years to complete. (This proved to be an advantage over England, where the 
lack of a similarly uniform system of valuation became an issue in debates over reform.)8 The 
1850 Act added 163,546 people to the rolls – 135,245 in the counties and 28,301 in the boroughs 




1850 was widely seen as a success. As the Irish chief secretary, Edward Cardwell, put it in 1860, 
it had ‘given general satisfaction.’10 
This electorate would remain essentially intact until 1885. 
As a result, there has been little attention paid to Irish franchise reform between 1850 and the 
franchise reform and redistribution of seats of 1884-855. The otherwise encyclopaedic Hoppen 
required only a paragraph to describe the multiple attempts at additional reform in this period ‘as 
shamefaced appendages to English proposals’, while dismissing the 1868 Reform Act as ‘the 
suitably mouse-like outcome of all this.’11 With the exception of Gerald Hall, no scholar gives 
the 1868 Reform Act or its origins and effects more than passing attention, and the present article 
is the first to be solely concerned with it. The neglect is explicable: the final Act was 
significantly less ambitious than originally intended, was lost in the dramatic disestablishment of 
the Church of Ireland, and then overtaken by events, in particular the collapse of Irish liberalism 
and the rise of Home Rule. The introduction of the ballot in 1872 made it even harder to judge 
the political impact of the reform. Only the 1868 election itself was fought under circumstances 
that can allow an assessment to be made, and then only partially due to the overwhelming force 
of Gladstone’s campaign against the Irish church. Yet, as Hall’s study of Ulster Liberalism 
demonstrated, it the Irish Reform Act could and did influence electoral outcomes and political 
culture. 
I 
The reform of 1850 was a success. As the Irish chief secretary, Edward Cardwell, put it in 1860, 
it had ‘given general satisfaction.’12 Therehe scale of the 1850 reforms meant that there was 




that any change concessions in Britain must be matched in Ireland. Irish Conservatives had the 
most to fear from this prospect. As the Dublin Evening Mail put it in 1859, every proposal from 
whichever party invariably had the same ‘bad feature’: any change to the franchise would 
necessarily ‘increase the political power of the Romish priesthood in Ireland.’13 This was true, 
although as we shall see not universally so, and it was anyway not necessarily appealing to the 
catholic hierarchy itself. Under the leadership of Archbishop Paul Cullen of Dublin, the bishops 
feared the consequences of nationalist passions and distrusted those who appealed to them. 
Franchise reform was consequently not a priority.   
Irish Liberals also welcomed in principle the prospect of additional reform. Most assumed that 
an enlarged franchise would benefit them, although their disastrous result in the otherwise 
triumphant 1859 general election was a reminder that the primary loyalty of catholic voters was 
to their church, not to the Liberal party.14 But Liberals also worried that too wide an extension 
might open the door to Conservative Orangemen in the north and advanced nationalists in the 
south. Neither they nor the bishops wanted the former and nobody wanted the latter. As a result, 
Ddemands were consequently modest. A meeting held in Dublin in February 1860, for example, 
urged that if England were to have a new reform bill, Ireland should be granted a £5 occupier 
franchise in the its inevitable companion bill. The moderate nationalist Freeman’s Journal 
thought this ‘obviously just’, and reassured its readers that it would not be ‘very “democratic”’. 
Of greater concern was the removal of vexatious barriers to registration, including the 
requirement that prospective voters prove that they had paid their rates. 15 
Cardwell’s 1860 proposal was duly tepid. It would merely, he told the Commons, introduce the 
same ‘general rules’ as were proposed for England and Wales. The £12 occupier franchise in the 




that this would add 30,000 voters in the counties and 6,655 in the boroughs, giving Ireland a total 
electorate of some 240,000. The freeman’s franchise would be preserved, but made the same as 
that in England. No one already qualified would lose his vote. Cork county and Dublin city 
would each get a third seat, to be taken from disenfranchised English boroughs. Cardwell also 
sought to remove the anomaly under which Irish peers such as Lord Palmerston could sit for 
English but not Irish constituencies.16 
Reaction was muted: the Freeman’s Journal worried that not requiring freemen to register 
annually would leave Dublin ‘a fixed property to the Conservative interest’; the Dublin Express 
mildly regretted the preservation of very small boroughs, suggesting that they had been saved ‘as 
places of refuge for great statesmen who have the misfortune of giving offence to large 
constituencies’; the Dublin suburb of Kingstown (modern Dún Laoghaire) wanted 
representation, and sent a delegation to London.17 In the Commons, some objected to the 
continuation of the requirement that prospective voters prove they had paid the relevant taxes 
before being registered. Even more objected to allowing Irish peers to sit for Irish seats. Lord 
Robert Cecil, the future Lord Salisbury, complained about Ireland receiving seats that had been 
‘filched’ from England. Yet even the most unbending of Irish Conservatives were broadly 
supportive. James Whiteside, the member for Dublin University and later a notably bigoted lord 
chief justice of Ireland, did not particularly object to the bill’s provisions but wondered why the 
government was bothering with reform at all.18 Unloved and largely unwanted, Cardwell’s bill 
died with Russell’s English reform bill. 
Demands for Irish reform continued to track events in England. Thus when the Liberals returned 
to English reform in 1865, they felt obligated to produce an Irish proposal to go with it. This, too, 
was notably modest. The headline was again a reduction of the borough occupier franchise from 
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£8 to £6. With typical complexity, it was further proposed to enfranchise any borough resident 
who was of age, not a criminal, and had continuously occupied lodgings in a dwelling house that 
as a whole had a ‘clear yearly value, if let unfurnished’ of over £10. A handful more might 
qualify by having lived in the same dwelling for at least six months while having kept £50 in a 
savings bank for two years. A key Liberal grievance was addressed by rendering it unnecessary 
for a voter to pay the qualifying rates himself, but the freemen were left unmolested despite 
appeals from leading Irish Liberals to ‘restrict their power’.19 Dublin city and Cork county would 
again get an additional seat, and the Queen’s University would be enfranchised. These seats 
would be obtained not from disenfranchised English seatsboroughs, but through the 
amalgamation of six Irish boroughsones: Portarlington and Athlone; Kinsale and Bandon; 
Dungannon and Enniskillen. Seven smaller constituencies would see their boundaries expanded 
(Cashel, Coleraine, Downpatrick, Ennis, Mallow, New Ross, and Youghal), but none would be 
disenfranchised.20 It was, of course, moot: the bill fell with Russell’s government in June 1866. 
II 
The change in administration put Irish reform into the hands of Richard Southwell Bourke, from 
1867 the 6th earl of Mayo. Now remembered largely for being assassinated while governor-
general of India, Mayo had already served two terms as Irish chief secretary (1852-53, 1858-59) 
under his courtesy title Lord Naas. He was the tolerant and reforming face of Irish 
conservatismConservatism, close to Disraeli and far removed from the sectarianism of many 
party colleagues.21 But Naas was also an effective political operator, building an unrivalled 
knowledge of Irish politics through his control of the Conservative electoral machinery over 
several general elections. In 1859, he had masterminded the stunning Conservative victory in 
Ireland despite the Liberal landslide in Britain. This was achieved by a combination of careful 




constituency-level management and an appeal to catholic voters enraged by the Italian policies of 
Russell and Palmerston. After years of ignorance, half-guesses and relative lack of interest, 
reform of the Irish electoral system was in the hands of one of the few men who apparently 
understood it.  
II 
 
The gathering reform agitation in England inevitably produced an Irish equivalent. This can be 
seen particularly in the career of the Irish Reform League (IRL), which was founded in Dublin in 
early November 1866. It has received little attention, with most historians either ignoring it 
completely or following Hoppen’s brusque dismissal of a ‘fleeting’ organisation notable only for 
favouring ‘cross-channel communication’.22 The IRL appears to have been organised by Edward 
Colston Keevil, a Dublin merchant who chaired its inaugural meeting and whose premises served 
as its temporary council rooms. Among other things, he sold patented matches under the brand 
‘Daniel O’Connell Lights’.23 But its inspiration lay in the radical campaign in Britain, fronted by 
John Bright.24 Indeed a representative of the English League, Thomas Connolly, had been in 
Ireland since late October trying to rally Irish support for franchise reform, and he was one of the 
eleven men present at the IRL’s inaugural meeting.  HeThe IRL shared its aim of universal 
manhood suffrage and emphasis on working-class participation in the electoral process, and a 
delegate from the London Reform League, Thomas Connolly, was one of the eleven men present 
at the IRL’s inaugural meeting. He addressed its second ‘in forcible terms on the rights of the 
working classes to enfranchisement in these countries’.25 The London League was so impressed 




speaker at the IRL’s second meeting, the journeyman printer Michael Richardson, moved thanks 
to the London League for its exertions on behalf of working men, and urged that its Irish 
counterpart co-operate with ‘Reformers of England and Scotland for the attainment of 
[representation in parliament for] ourselves and our brethren’, ‘on the basis of residential 
manhood suffrage protected by the Ballot.’ 27  
The IRL was not intended only for Dublin’s small population of non-republican working class 
urban radicals. Keevil and Connolly had also managed to recruit three prominent city aldermen: 
William Lane-Joynt, Patrick J.James Plunket and Peter Paul McSwiney.28 All were active 
Liberals and members of the national association, the political vehicle of the catholic bishops. 
(Although Plunket, a prosperous pawnbroker, was on its nationalist fringe.)29 The most 
significant was McSwiney, the wealthy proprietor of Dublin’s famous ‘Monster Store’ on 
Sackville Street and a once and future lord mayor of the city. He had built his political career as a 
creature of the catholic hierarchy, and in late 1864 had co-founded the national association as the 
political vehicle of the bishops. When Archbishop Cullen explained to him the grievances that 
the association should pursue, he listed ‘the condition of the small landholders, the taxation of 
the country, the exclusion of catholics from offices of trust and emolument, and above all the 
education question’, before agreeing that the overriding parliamentary issue was the 
disestablishment of the Church of Ireland. He did not mention franchise reform.30 For Cullen, the 
point of the national association lay in proving that, ‘by sending Petitions to Parliament, and by 
other peaceful and constitutional means, the best results may be obtained’.31 By contrast, the 
fenians and their violence ‘must inevitably lead to the establishment of tyranny and despotism.’32  
With McSwiney’s enthusiastic agreement, the national association supported Russell’s 1866 




set for Ireland, but because the Liberals had begun to show a willingness to address other Irish 
grievances and they thought it was thought likely that a wider franchise would strengthen thethe 
party  Liberals in England. The calculation was that disestablishment was unobtainable from the 
Conservatives, whatever else they might offer. Independent opposition was thus abandoned in 
favour of keeping the Liberals in and the tories out. The calculation was that disestablishment 
was unobtainable from the Conservatives, whatever else they might offer.  
But Keevil was not content with municipal politicians, however prominent or well-connected. At 
the League’s second meeting on 13 November, it was announced that Daniel O’Donoghue, better 
known as The O’Donoghue of the Glens, would join McSwiney in taking ‘an active part in the 
movement.’33 The O’Donoghue had enjoyed a high profile public career after winning a 
sensational by-election in 1857 at the age of only 24. He quickly established himself as a leader 
of the rump Independent Irish Party, and was for a time the ‘great nationalist hope’.34 He had a 
taste for the showy, organising fronting several events with advanced nationalist overtones, 
including the massive 1861 funeral procession of the fenian Terence Bellew MacManus. This 
was a direct provocation to Archbishop Cullen, who had refused the use of Dublin’s churches. 
The O’Donoghue went even further down that politically dangerous road when he unsuccessfully 
flirted with forming a common political front with the fenians, a group that Cullen thought 
essentially demonic.35 Four years later, he founded the national league for the repeal of the 
union. It too failed, not least because of episcopal opposition. In 1865, he changed both tack and 
parliamentary seat and sought to ingratiate himself with the hierarchy by abandoning 
independent opposition and supporting the Liberals.36 He eventually opposed the Land League 
and Home Rule, before changing course again and standing as a Home Ruler in 1880. His 




almost certainly part of The O’Donoghue’s ongoing attempts at rehabilitation. He was perhaps 
less ‘unlikely’ as a radical leader than K. T. Hoppen thought.37 
The Irish Reform League announced its intentions on 27 November 1866. Signed by The 
O’Donoghue as president and McSwiney as vice president, its demand was simple: ‘every man 
of full age, untainted by criminal conviction, if he has given hostages to his country by the 
possession of a home beneath its laws, shall have a vote in the election of Parliamentary 
representatives.’ Ireland, ‘as well as England and Scotland’, had been ‘ruled by a class, and not 
by the free voices of the population.’ Under the ‘baneful sway’ of this oligarchy, the country’s 
industry had withered, its natural resources were not exploited, and ‘under this class-rule our 
agricultural population … is being steadily destroyed.’ The ‘selfishness and injustice of a class’ 
should be replaced by ‘the wisdom, the justice, and the patriotism of a united, enfranchised 
people.’ ‘It is time’, they wrote, ‘that those upon whom the burdens of the state are thrown, who 
pay the taxes that others impose, should be admitted to a voice in the administration of their own 
affairs’.38  
The IRL’s address echoed English rhetoric on reform, including Gladstone’s famous if 
ambiguous claim for the ‘moral right’ to the franchise of any man ‘not presumably incapacitated 
by some consideration of personal unfitness or political danger’.39 Its language was also similar 
to that employed by Bright in his great reform speech in Glasgow in mid-October 1866 and 
repeated thereafter.40 The League’s emphasis on the ‘oppression’ of taxation without 
representation and its association of the franchise with ‘the privileges of free men’ also reflected 
English radical discourse.41 As Eugenio Biagini noted of the English radicals, ‘the franchise was 
at one and the same time the means of liberty and its substance and symbol: a citizen could not 




Bright’s influence was more than simply rhetorical. He had long cultivated Irish support and 
urged cross-channel collaboration on a variety of issues, including disestablishment. He noisily 
opposed the suspension of habeas corpus in Ireland in 1866, and w. When he visited Ireland that 
autumn he received a rapturous welcome. The O’Donoghue spoke at a banquet in his honour, 
moderate nationalist newspapers praised him, and Cullen (now a cardinal, Ireland’s first) met 
him. Cullen’s public reception of Bright was intended as a green light for catholics to collaborate 
with him, and it made possible the involvement of the Cullenite McSwiney and the repentant 
O’Donoghue. But the cardinal’s support was wary and conditional. As he confided privately in 
late October 1866, Cullen thought that Bright’s campaign would ‘put down the Protestant 
church.’ But, he added in an important caveat, ‘I hope he will stop there.’43 Cullen had no 
interest in reform, only in disestablishment and, to a significantly lesser extent, land reform. He 
made his position perfectly clear in a letter to Archbishop Henry Edward Manning of 
Westminster. Writing in what seems to have been early December, he told Manning that ‘Mr. 
Bright & his party have made considerable progress in this country.’ Still, as yet ‘no Bishops and 
scarcely any priests have joined the Reform Association [i.e. the Irish Reform League], as they 
are not quite certain that the agitation may not be turned into a revolutionary movement.’ As 
Manning doubtless understood, by ‘they’ Cullen meant primarily himself. But, he continued, 
‘The Reformers promise to aid in pulling down the Protestant Church in Ireland and settling the 
land question.’44 Cullen’s desire to cultivate and shape English radical support for 
disestablishment and land reform explains the cardinal’s otherwise inexplicable (if still indirect) 
endorsement of the Irish Reform League. 
In a public letter to McSwiney published on 24 December, Cullen noted that he had just seen a 




the IRL. Its subject was the Irish church establishment and the League’s proposals for its fate. 
Cullen was unhappy with the letter’s unfamiliarity with the ‘real state of the question’ and 
ignorance of the ‘history and circumstances’ of Ireland. He urged McSwiney to exercise a ‘real 
influence’ on the English radicals, and ‘lay before them a true picture of our grievances, and of 
the remedies necessary to remove them’.45 At the IRL’s next meeting McSwiney dutifully 
proposed from the chair that ‘steps should be taken to send deputations to represent the League, 
and point out the wants and wishes of Ireland to the people of the sister countries as he found 
there was a lamentable lack of true knowledge of Ireland.’46 But even a tentative alliance of 
clerical Liberals with Irish and English radicals was unlikely to last. The interests of Cullen, 
McSwiney or The O’Donoghue were incompatible with those of Keevil,  (who openly admired 
Charles Bradlaugh), P. J. Shanley, the League’s secretary and a journeyman printercompositor, 
or James A. Mowatt, a Methodist, temperance campaigner, advocate of secular education and 
pioneer of Irish vegetarianism. In late January 1867, for example, a delegation from the League 
called on Jonathan Pim, a Quaker businessman who had been at school with Cullen and had 
received the cardinal’s vote when he was elected as a Liberal for Dublin city in 1865.47 
Unusually for an Irish Liberal, Pim had opposed Russell’s plans for reform, which saw him 
tarred as an ‘Adullamite’ in an ill-tempered encounter with Keevil, Shanley, Mowatt, and 
Michael Richardson.48 They urged that the IRL use its influencecampaign against Pim in any 
future election.49 McSwiney’s reaction is not recorded, but can be easily guessed. Keevil 
compounded the offence by representing himself at a reform meeting in Manchester in early 
February as second only to The O’Donoghue amongst Irish reformers. The result was the 




The fenians’ abortive attempt at a national rising on 5 March made things much worse. Cullen 
believed that the rebels had ‘generally’ been ‘tailors, shoemakers, and other tradesmen’. At least 
16 had actually been employed by McSwiney.51 This was exactly the class that the IRL hoped to 
enfranchise and from whom it sought support. Cullen and most other Liberals had never desired 
manhood a dramatically enlarged suffrage, but now it appeared to be an actively dangerous 
demand. The effect was immediate: by the end of March, those newspapers still covering the 
IRL’s affairs were focussed on its internal dissensions.52 On 9 April, the League’s minutes 
recorded both a ‘small attendance of members’ and the creation of a deputation to ‘wait upon 
Alderman McSwiney for the purpose of inducing him to preside at the meetings of the league 
occasionally.’53 Lane-Joynt and Plunket also appear to have withdrawn, and The O’Donoghue’s 
‘continuous absence’ was soon noted, although he did not resign, remained close to the English 
League and continued to speak on the subject in parliament.54 Without Cullen’s implicit support, 
the League IRL could be disregarded. Prominent figures such as Isaac Butt and Sir John Gray 
(the proprietor of the Freeman’s Journal and an MP) gave the organisation short shrift despite 
direct approaches, and the catholic and liberal press largely ignored it. In mid-June, the 
conservative Dublin Evening Mail unkindly but not unfairly described the IRL as a ‘knot of a 
half-dozen persons’ who ‘exchange epistles with the rioters of St. James’s Hall, and hold a hole-
and-corner meeting occasionally in some obscure retreat in Dublin.’55 
The IRL rapidly became more working class and more radical. Even before the Cullenites’ 
departure, its original executive committee had been augmented by a grocer’s assistant, a 
carpenter, a hair-dresser and a draughtsman.56 It also fell more directly under English influence. 
In June 1867, for example, it was proposed that 24 Englishmen be added as members, six as vice 
presidents. Lectures by leading English radicals such as Ernest Jones were organised.57 Their 
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audience seems to have been Dublin’s working class: the Builders’ Labourers Association, for 
example, requested 460 tickets to a lecture in late August.58 The reaction of the catholic church 
was predictable: one member of the executive committee reported in mid-October that he had 
‘been obliged to retire from a religious society’ because his parish priest had anathematized the 
League.59 Matters came to a head with the English Reform League’s late 1867 election of 
Giuseppe Garibaldi as a vice president. Honouring the pope’s tormentor was politically toxic in 
Ireland, even among radicals.60 This moved The O’Donoghue to complain directly about the 
Reform League’s ‘exhibition of antipapal tendencies’, while sSeven members of the IRL’s 
executive committee voted not to ‘receive’ the notification of Garibaldi’s Garibaldi’s election 
and , and four to voted to publically denounce it.61  London’s explanation that its support for the 
Italian nationalist was not ‘religious’ and ‘not intended as an affront to Ireland, or Irishmen’ 
simply revealed the gulf between the two nations.62 
The disagreement wrecked the League, which to London’s ‘regret’ soon suspended operations.63 
Keevil implausibly claimed that the real cause was government persecution, an explanation the 
English League appears to have accepted. (Edmond Beales reported that the Irish ‘had given up 
the ghost rather than run the chance of being put down by the police.’)64 Although Keevil 
quickly revived the IRL with English support, it ceased to have any importance.65 As R. V. 
Comerford put it, ‘the catholic ecclesiastical and middle-class people who were the leading Irish 
allies of Bright and Gladstone, did not wish to have propagated in Ireland the secularist ideas that 





The IRL’s disintegration coincided with the expected introduction of an Irish reform bill in 
March 1867. The billThis was delayed by the more contentious English reform, although 
Disraeli promised to bring it forward after Easter.67 Some thought this a ‘fraud’, and predicted 
that whatever did emerge would be insignificant: ‘Mr Disraeli’, the Dublin Evening Post wrote 
in mid-March, ‘is just as likely to establish the Irish Republic’ as to grant household suffrage.68 
Conservatives were not so sure: the Irish Times had hoped that the government would ‘not deem 
it necessary or expedient’ to legislate at all. There had been a ‘total absence of any call or desire 
for Reform on the part of any political section of this country’, and the ‘existing franchise’ 
already admitted ‘every member of the working or other class who possess respectability.’ If 
legislation was necessary, it should be limited to boundary revisions and other technical matters. 
On no account should the qualification be reduced, as Ireland would be ‘plunged in turmoil, 
trouble, and agitation.’69 The Dublin Evening Mail agreed, claiming that while ‘Irishmen differ 
on a thousand things, and agree about very few’, they did agree that lowering the franchise could 
only produce ‘the most unmitigated evil consequences’ and introduce ‘a Fenian element into 
electoral warfare.’70 
Yet no bill appeared. Further postponements were announced in April, again in May and then in 
early June. The delay only increased tensions. How, the nationalist Nation wondered, could 
Ireland be denied reform? Was the situation there ‘so much superior to that of Great Britain, that, 
while amendment is required in that country, none is required here?’71 The more moderate 
nationalist Freeman’s Journal warned against any variation in the franchise between the two 
islands as ‘an insulting defiance to Ireland’.72 But agitation was not limited to nationalists or 
catholics. In mid-June, some 4000 people (‘two-thirds of them being Orangemen’) rallied at the 




arranged by the Irish Reform League, and was entirely independent of the southern organisation. 
The primary organiser appears to have been John Rea, a prominent Belfast solicitor who had 
served prison time for his complicity in the 1848 Young Ireland revolt. The presbyterian Rea had 
built his reputation as the scourge of the city’s tory machine, but by the mid-1850s he had 
divided Belfast liberalism by his pugnacity, narcissism and aggressively nationalist rhetoric. He 
then formed an alliance with the city’s catholics that endured into the mid-1860s.73 Although Rea 
was notoriously erratic, his leadership at the Ulster Hall marked what the Freeman’s Journal 
rightly called ‘an extraordinary and unexpected turn of events’.74  
The meeting was chaired by Thomas Hardy, a master printer and the district Orange Secretary. 
He told the crowd that the ‘movement was entirely confined to the working classes’ and 
demanded as a matter of right the same franchise ‘which the Government was extending to the 
people of England.’ Rea agreed, urging that ‘what an Englishman was entitled to an Irishman 
ought to have’ and that ‘what an Englishman got an Irishman would not do without.’ But Rea 
went further, reminding ‘the Orangemen of Ulster’ that the province’s 29 parliamentary seats 
could hold the balance of power. That made ‘Orangemen the most powerful body of politicians 
in the three kingdoms’, more than ‘100,000 armed men, every man of whom had the blood of 
Oliver Cromwell in his veins’. Yet only 300 of the 6000 Orangemen in Belfast had the vote. He 
urged them ‘to use their power for their own benefit, irrespective of whether any other class of 
their fellow countrymen reaped collateral advantages.’75 
As the Ulster Observer noted, such a meeting was remarkable: the sole popular demonstration 
for an extended Irish franchise came from ‘the most Conservative portion of our Conservative 
population’, and was held not in Dublin or Cork, but ‘in a town where its very utterance was 




in a movement calculated to enlist the sentiments of the nation on a national question.’76 This 
was not, in fact, as incongruous as it might seem: northern working class protestants (mostly 
presbyterian, although not exclusively so) had much to gain from the franchises being mooted in 
Britain. As the liberal Banner of Ulster fretted after the meeting, the power of the Orange Order 
‘will be greatly increased when the Reform Bill takes effect.’77 Moreover, as the member for 
County Londonderry, R. P. Dawson, pointed out, Scotland’s 3 million people were represented 
by 53 members, whereas Ulster’s 1.9 million had only 29. On that basis, the province should 
have about 40 seats, and he reminded the Commons that there were ‘several growing towns … of 
some 7,000 to 10,000 inhabitants which were now wholly unrepresented.’78 The protestant and 
conservative, but Dublin-based, Evening Mail reminded its readers that the result of applying the 
principles proposed for Scotland and England would be that a ‘transfer of power must be 
effected from South to North’. Both ‘justice and policy’ would necessitate ‘conceding additional 
representation to places with increasing population and commercial activity’.79 
This prospect alarmed many Liberals and almost all catholics, but also many Irish Conservatives. 
This was especially true of those who were members of the embattled Church of Ireland, which 
included much of the party’s membership (overwhelmingly so in the south) and most of its 
leadership, including Lord Mayo.80 Irish presbyterians and other dissenters rarely harboured 
tender feelings for the establishment.81 This was noticed in Belfast: as a speaker at the Ulster 
Hall pointed out to the hissing crowd, many Irish Conservative MPs actively opposed their 
government’s reform bill, including at least one of the city’s two members.82 
The next day, Disraeli announced that nothing would be done until the following parliamentary 
session. His explanation was that, ‘owing to a foreign and external agency acting upon the 
sentiments of a morbid character in a portion of the population, there is in Ireland at the present 
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moment a very general feeling of distrust and danger.’83 By this he meant the fenians, not the 
Orangemen. Irish reaction was predictable: the Freeman’s Journal decried the chancellor’s 
‘impudent pretence’, while the Dublin Evening Post expressed its ‘absolute amazement’ and 
argued that Irish unrest was in fact the reason reform must go ahead.84 The Dublin Evening Mail, 
by contrast, felt ‘a sense of relief which we are perfectly sure all classes of the Irish public 
share.’ Yet Disraeli did not make a particularly compelling argument: the fenians had been 
suppressed in early March, tensions were visibly easing and the government had continued until 
June to promise that a bill was imminent. What had changed? 
The reason was obvious: backbench unrest was serious enough without adding an Irish rebellion. 
As The O’Donoghue put it in the Commons debate on the delay, Irish tories were prepared to 
follow ‘silently and obsequiously’ so long as the subject was English or Scottish reform, ‘but 
when they felt their own time coming … they could no longer be kept within bounds.’ Ireland 
could not be dealt with until English (and Scottish) reform had been settled. Until then, Irish 
Conservatives might plausibly threaten the government; after, Disraeli could brandish the 
prospect of reform being carried under a Liberal administration. The point was made when 
Gladstone declared that not only was an Irish bill necessary, it would necessarily be on the same 
terms as those offered to England.85 
In the meantime, Mayo began to draw up a comprehensive reform. Liberals inevitably feared that 
his goal was ‘the extinction so far as possible of the Liberal representation of Ireland.’86 This was 
paranoia, but Mayo naturally drew on his detailed knowledge to craft a bill that was as helpful as 
possible to the Conservatives. His focus was consequently on the mechanics of registration, 




secondary one; despite the hopes of many Irish Conservatives (particularly in the south), there 
was little doubt that the qualification would be reduced, at least in the boroughs. 
The redistribution of seats was more contentious. There was widespread but not universal 
agreement that the only alternative to disenfranchising a number of very small boroughs was 
either to merge them, to expand their boundaries, to create entirely new groupings of adjacent 
towns, or to attempt some combination of these options. Each approach would free up seats for 
underrepresented areas. The Liberals had proposed limited amalgamations and boundary 
expansions in 1866, and the Dublin Liberal MP Jonathan Pim had given Mayo a similar but more 
extensive plan in late 1867.87 
Grouping and reallocation gave the chief secretary some hope of Liberal support (necessary to 
navigating the Commons) while retaining control of the details. Mayo’s papers contain extensive 
notes for several such schemes, which though undated were almost certainly created in late 1867 
or early 1868. He agreed with Pim and many others about increasing the representation of 
Dublin, Cork and Belfast, and dividing County Cork into two ridings – the argument for the last 
was ‘perfectly irresistible’.88 But Mayo also contemplated allocating a third seat to counties 
Down, Tyrone and Tipperary. He noted that the four counties had on average one representative 
per 5625 electors (and 156,243 people) as against one per 2302 electors (and 66,970 people) in 
the other 28, and one member per £360,379 of rateable value compared to one per £150,799. 
Such a change seemed likely to ensure two or even three Conservative seats in already tory 
Down and Tyrone, and perhaps add a Conservative in previously Liberal or independent 
Tipperary. Depending where the six seats were found, Conservative representation might be 




This would have set an important precedent: if a county could gain a seat based on population 
and wealth, without being divided into ridings, smaller or poorer counties could also lose seats. 
On what basis should Longford, with 2767 electors, have the same representation as Antrim, 
with 10,921?90 This logic might appeal to some Irish Conservatives, especially in the north, as 
Longford returned two Liberals and Antrim two Conservatives, but the precedent was unlikely to 
entice British tories. Problems also bedevilled the grouping of boroughs. Although commonplace 
in Scotland, this was described by the Irish Conservative James Whiteside as adding ‘one 
melancholy little town to another melancholy little town, and their union makes a still more 
melancholy state of things than did their separate existence’.91 Pim had envisaged grouping a 
handful, but Mayo considered going much further. In one draft, Leinster would have 34 seats, 
with the 12 counties accounting for 24, Dublin city three, Drogheda, Dundalk, Kilkenny, and 
Wexford one each, and then three groups of towns each with one member. A number of smaller 
boroughs, such as Carlow and New Ross, would be subsumed into the larger groups. Ulster 
would see no addition to its 29 members, but Belfast would get its third seat, Londonderry, 
Newry, and Armagh would have one each, and there would be five groups, also with one each. 
Munster (27 seats) and Connaught (13) would have similar arrangements, except that Waterford 
and Limerick cities would continue to return two members while Cork city would get a third and 
the county would be divided into two ridings returning two members each. Galway city lost its 
second member (another Pim recommendation), which was allocated to a new grouping 
consisting of the towns of Ballina, Castlebar and Westport.92 Grouping was logical, avoided 
disenfranchisement and opened an alluring vista for gerrymandering, but was also open to almost 




Mayo’s plan finally appeared on 19 March 1868, just a few days after Gladstone announced his 
intention to bring forward a motion to disestablish the Church of Ireland.93  Although the scheme 
had first been presented to Cabinet in early February, it had proved contentious and the 
government decided to ‘wait events a little before further considering the subject’. 94 Now there 
was no point in waiting. Grouping was abandoned entirely as politically unworkable, but there 
would be two new members for County Cork and one each for Tyrone, Down and Tipperary. 
Dublin city would get an additional seat, but with the stipulation that the third seatit would be 
reserved for the minority thus guaranteeing Conservative representation in the capitol. Neither 
Belfast nor Cork city received an additional seat, but the Queen’s University was enfranchised.  
Downpatrick, Dungannon, Bandon, Kinsale, Cashel and Portarlington were to be 
disenfranchised, costing the parties three seats each. A commission would be created to 
determine the boundaries of the boroughs, with the expectation that there would be substantial 
augmentations at the expense of the counties. The borough franchise was extended to those who 
occupied property above £4 in rateable value, and there would be a lodger franchise on the 
English model of occupation for a year of premises worth at least £10.95 The county franchise 
was unchanged. The existing procedures and requirements for registration were also retained.  
Irish reaction was again predictable. The Freeman’s Journal grumbled that the lodger franchise 
mattered only in Dublin, worried about the expansion of the borough boundaries, was annoyed 
that Ireland did not receive more seats, and thought £4 ‘a trifle, for it adds less than ten thousand 
to the borough constituencies’.96 The Dublin Evening Post was furious that the county franchise 
did not match that in England.97 On the other hand, the establishment Irish Times accepted that 
the very small boroughs needed to go, worried that Mayo had effectively introduced household 




balance, it thought, the bill was as good as could be expected.98 Others were less sanguine: the 
liberal Banner of Ulster, for example, decried the £4 franchise as a gift to Orangemen who 
lacked ‘the intelligence and morality’ to be entrusted with the vote.99 On the Conservative side, 
one of Mayo’s regular correspondents predicted that a £4 franchise would cost the party the 
Ulster seats of Armagh, Dungannon, Enniskillen, Lisburn, Londonderry, Newry and one seat in 
Belfast, as well as Bandon, Sligo and one seat in Dublin. If the county qualification was then 
reduced on amendment, he predicted that ‘Cardinal Cullen would carry all in Connaught – 
Munster – Leinster except Dublin & a good many in Ulster.’ He hoped that protestant radicals 
might hesitate to make the cardinal ‘a pocket owner of so many boroughs and counties.’ This 
would guarantee the return of numerous ‘repeal members’ and thus be ‘the great lever to separate 
the two countries’.100 
But Mayo had been clever. His bill stipulated thatpreserved the principle that the borough 
franchise continue to bewas tied directly to the proven payment of rates. In Ireland these became 
payable above £4 of rated value in most of the country and above £8 in the five largest cities, 
including Dublin and Belfast. Between £4 and £8 the rates were by custom usually split or paid 
entirely by the landlord.101 There were two distinct stings: because Mayo insisted maintained the 
requirement ofon personal payment, in most boroughs many newly enfranchised voters would 
have to choose between paying additional taxes and voting. In the five larger cities, by making 
occupiers or owners of property valued between £4 and £8 liable for the first time, Mayo could 
anticipate a substantial increase either in non-payment or non-registration. The national impact 
was unclear, but likely to favour the Conservatives. According to the head of the Irish poor law 
commission, in 1865 only 1061 borough voters (876 of them in Dublin) and 1293 county voters 
had been excluded on the grounds of non-payment.102 Presumably the lower borough franchise 
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would increase that number. The Conservative election agent in small and competitive Carlow, 
for example, calculated that an above £4 franchise would add 83 voters, but ‘I know I can 
disqualify from 20 to 30 out of that, if personal payment of rates is imperative as I am quite 
aware that in the majority of cases those Houses are let for a week but less Taxes.’ With the 
Liberal advantage expected to be around 30 after the first registration, ‘we could still fight’.103 
Mayo sought to further limit the impact of a widened franchise through two key clauses in the 
companion Registration Bill.   The 32nd clause made it a misdemeanour to claim to be a lodger 
when already rated as an occupier, in order ‘to prevent occupiers who have not paid their rates 
from claiming as lodgers in the same house’.104  The 33rd required that those registering as a 
lodger provide the revising barrister with positive evidence of their qualification.  As the law 
stood, it was necessary to make a formal objection to each suspect claim, no matter how absurd.  
This placed an intolerable burden on the local Conservative apparatus in constituencies such as 
Dublin, where there were ‘seldom less than 3 claims preferred by each claimant’.105  As Mayo 
wrote privately, without the two clauses ‘the expense of Revision in large cities will become so 
enormous, that no one will venture to undertake the responsibility.’106  The creation of a new 
misdemeanour was rejected in Committee on the grounds that no such offence existed in 
England, but the Commons accepted that no one ‘duly’ rated as an occupier could register as a 
lodger. Liberal wariness of a too extensive franchise overcame a natural reluctance to aid 
Conservative election agents, and the 33rd clause passed with Irish support.  Sir John Gray, for 
example, regaled the House with the story of a man who ‘claimed the vote in twenty counties’, 
got on the register in 18, ‘and voted in five’.107 The cumulative effect of these restrictions is 
difficult to quantify, although Brian M. Walker has estimated that in 1874 some 21,000 people in 






Although the bill had finally appeared, it had taken too long. The passage of the English Reform 
Act and Gladstone’s declaration for Irish disestablishment had made an early dissolution 
inevitable. Irish reform was widely agreed to be one of the issues that should be resolved first 
before the election, but there was little appetite for an extended debate. As the Dublin Evening 
Post noted in late May 1868, the Liberals did not want to do anything to delay parliament 
finishing its business.109 The Conservatives on the other hand did not want to push too far, for 
fear that the Liberals would prefer entirely fresh legislation under Gladstone. This prospect 
terrified those Irish members already looking into the abyss of disestablishment. 
The government consequently decided privately on 13 June to abandon the entire idea of 
redistribution.110 Ireland’s constituencies would remain exactly as they were. The necessity of 
this decision was revealed in the first substantive parliamentary debate two days later. Not 
knowing that redistribution had been abandoned, various speakers pointed out inconsistencies, 
including the apparently arbitrary (but in fact politically balanced) selection of the six boroughs 
marked for disenfranchisement. Some wanted only tiny Portarlington (106 electors) abolished 
and its seat handed to Kingstown. Pim wanted to augment the boroughs at the expense of the 
counties, while the Conservative General Francis Dunne of the Queen’s County wanted to 
augment the counties at the expense of the boroughs. Sir Frederick Heygate of County 
Londonderry wanted more seats for Ulster. In all, more than 100 amendments were proposed.111 
Almost certainly prompted by the government, Joseph Warner Henley of Oxfordshire suggested 




reasonable period.’ The former Liberal chief secretary Chichester Fortescue agreed. He thought 
the proposed redistribution ‘objectionable’ and ‘utterly impossible to assent to’, and so better 
postponed. Mayo then made it official.112  
On other matters Mayo chose to fight, in particular over whether the borough threshold should be 
£4 or ‘above’ £4. He had specified the latter. The Liberal lawyer James Anthony Lawson of 
Portarlington proposed that it should be £4 exactly. He pointed out that valuations were made in 
10s increments, which meant the franchise would actually require a rating of at least £4 10s. He 
implied that this might tempt ‘Government valuators’ to consider the franchise in arriving at their 
valuations. Mayo responded that giving the vote to those occupying exactly £4 properties meant 
that they would have to pay rates for the first time. And because Lawson’s proposal would 
require a revision of how rates were collected nationally, and not just in parliamentary boroughs, 
some 39,000 people would become taxpayers but only 1931 of them voters, and then mostly in 
Dublin.113 The amendment was narrowly defeated, by 188 votes to 177.114 The government also 
saw off attempts to enfranchise the Queen’s University (183-173), abolish the freeman franchise 
entirely (155-109), lower the county franchise to £8 (241-205) and introduce the ballot (225-
126).115 Although the boundary commission was abandoned, Mayo secured approval to extend 
parliamentary boundaries to meet municipal ones in the five boroughs (Dublin, Belfast, 
Londonderry, Dundalk, and Athlone) where the latter had come to exceed the former. He also 
managed to preserve the requirement that rates be paid before a voter could be registered. 
Although Disraeli delighted in having avoided ‘many difficulties & defeats’ to pass the bill ‘by a 
decided majority’, nNobody was impressed by the final result.116 Mayo had secured much less 
than he wanted, although he had at least maintained control. The Liberals obtained nothing, but 
had prevented much they considered mischievous. They also did not now have to do the job 




themselves. Irish observers were less forgiving. The Dublin Evening Mail, for example, believed 
that the government could have counterbalanced the £4 ‘engine of Radicalism’ with 
redistribution, if only it had had the courage of its convictions.117 By contrast, the Dublin 
Evening Post thought the ‘popular interest in Ireland suffered grave and unexpected loss during 
the progress of the mockery called the Irish Reform Bill’, and complained that the Liberals had 
not rallied to reduce the county franchise.118 The reality was that franchise reform was never high 
on the Irish agenda outwith Belfast, and the imminent prospect of disestablishment crowded it 
out entirely. 
But everybody was wrong: Mayo had significantly underestimated the impact on the borough 
electorate. In the 1865 general election, there had been 30,673 borough electors in Ireland. In 
1868, there were 45,625, an increase of nearly 50%. Mayo had expected only 9,313 new electors 
but got 14,952. (Belfast alone accounted for 8753.) Some could be attributed to natural increase, 
but most were the direct result of the Reform Act.119 The impact was even more significant at 
constituency level, where the increase was almost everywhere substantial and in some places 
exceptionally so. Belfast grew by an astonishing 256%, and several others by more than 50%. 
Only Limerick (1%) and Downpatrick (5%) saw less than double digit increases. Although 
growth was largest in Ulster (which more than doubled its borough electorate), it was not 
concentrated there. 
Table 1: Borough Voter Increase, 1865-1868120 
 Electors 1865 Electors 1868 % Increase 
Armagh 409 603 47 
Athlone 246 318 29 
Bandon 231 295 28 
Belfast 3415 12168 256 
Carlow 255 352 38 




Cashel 146 203 39 
Clonmel 350 436 25 
Coleraine 259 346 34 
Cork 3143 3536 13 
Downpatrick 230 241 5 
Drogheda 581 726 25 
Dublin 10666 12899 21 
Dundalk 287 447 56 
Dungannon 174 245 41 
Dungarvan 257 311 21 
Ennis 189 231 22 
Enniskillen 264 341 29 
Galway 1182 1381 17 
Kilkenny 574 739 29 
Kinsale 145 172 19 
Limerick 2005 2032 1 
Lisburn 313 469 50 
Londonderry 876 1483 69 
Mallow 171 208 22 
New Ross 191 259 36 
Newry 539 796 48 
Portarlington 106 134 26 
Sligo 379 520 37 
Tralee 238 263 11 
Waterford 1156 1383 20 
Wexford 334 520 56 
Youghal 237 278 17 
 
V 
It is difficult to assess the immediate impact of the Reform Act, largely because the promise of 
disestablishment hardened partisan divisions. There was no chance of a reprise of the 1859 
alliance of catholics and Conservatives in the south, despite the hopes of Mayo and Disraeli. 
Irish Anglicans were largely confirmed in their alliance with the Conservatives, despite the 
support for disestablishment offered by Irish Liberals such as Sir John Gray. It is unlikely to be 
coincidental that the Conservatives’ sole gain (excepting corrupt Sligo) was James Anthony 
Lawson’s tiny Portarlington. Although a Liberal and former Liberal office-holder, Lawson was a 
committed member of the Church of Ireland and unwilling to countenance disestablishment. 




of 46-35. In 1868, he lost 69-51. Whether Liberals punished him by abstaining (14 voters did) or 
by siding with his opponent is unclear but seems likely. Certainly if the bulk of the 28 souls 
enfranchised by the Act were protestant, it would make the borough (located in the Queen’s 
County) unique outside Ulster. In most places, the additional voters simply augmented existing 
majorities. There were exceptions, particularly Dublin, where the large protestant population had 
regularly returned at least one Conservative. McSwiney, Cullen, and Sir John Gray consequently 
established the Central Franchise Association to ensure newly eligible catholics were registered 
to vote.121 Yet outside of Ulster and a handful of southern seats, the £4 franchise gave little scope 
for inter-party advantage. A significant increase of humbler voters, however, could give an edge 
in intra party conflict, or in the. It could also change the sort of candidates preferred by catholic 
and nationalist voters in the south and Conservative and protestant voters in the north. This is 
worth bearing in mind when considering the astonishing success of home rulers at the 1874 
general election. 
Ulster’s politics were certainly could be disrupted by the advent of new voters. This was 
particularly true of Belfast, where an unholy alliance of opportunistic catholics and newly 
enfranchised protestants combined to return William Johnston, a notorious Orangeman who had 
been briefly imprisoned for leading a prohibited march. Johnston ran as a Conservative, but 
based his cross-community appeal on his enthusiasm for disestablishment.122 Even with catholic 
support, he defeated the incumbent Conservative only because many of the newly enfranchised 
were drawn from a working -class presbyteriansism that was out ofunsympathetic to sympathy 
with  a Conservative elite with whom it they had little in common. But the changes did not 
simply aid Orange candidates. In Londonderry, Lord Claud Hamilton, a son of the newly created 




franchise raising the catholic proportion of the electorate from 24% to 38% of the whole. 
Catholic voters were joined by a substantial number of liberal presbyterians who either voted for 
Dowse or did not vote at all.123 In Newry, the Liberal William Kirk secured the support of 9 
members of the Church of Ireland, 36 presbyterians and other protestants and 341 catholics, 
nearly one-third of whom (102) had been newly enfranchised. His incumbent opponent, the 
Anglican viscount Newry, received the support of only 83 new voters, 45 of whom were 
members of the Church of Ireland, 31 presbyterian or other protestant, and 7 catholic. Kirk’s 
majority was seven.124 Ulster’s politics continued to evolve as its sectarian divisions hardened, 
but the Reform Act clearly had an influence there as elsewhere in Ireland. The reform of 1868 
was not on the order of 1829, 1832, 1850, or 1884-855, but it was rather more important than its 
reputation would suggest. 
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